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Abstract 
  
The NCAA has experienced controversy for many years now, but it may have 
another issue to grapple with because of their “amateurism” clause. Many student-
athletes are concerned about the NCAA amateur clause and its impact on their “right 
of publicity”. The NCAA has consistently argued that athletes should not be paid 
because they are in fact students and are most likely on scholarship, either academic 
or athletic. Additionally, student-athletes are claiming that their intellectual property 
rights are being violated in “fair trade” and the unfair use of “image likeness” in the 
NCAA video game issue brought forward in the Ed O’Bannon case. This case is 
potentially the turning point in this dispute, which has been defended by the NCAA 
and their use of amateurism clause. With that, the amateurism clause and intellectual 
property rights are all integral facets of this research project. 
The issue with intellectual property has been increasing in the recent history 
of the NCAA. Lawsuits such as the Jeremy Bloom and Ed O’Bannon cases have been 
troublesome for the national governing body of college athletics. Athletes claim that 
the NCAA is breaking antitrust laws because the organization is using their images 
and likeness’ for commercial use. Section one and two of the Sherman Antitrust Act 
prohibits action restraining trade in a relevant market and prohibits conduct 
enabling an organization to hold a monopoly over the relevant market. The NCAA 
prohibits student-athletes from receiving any money from their image or likeness 
because of the amateur clause.  
  The cases of Bloom v NCAA and O’Bannon v. NCAA are two essential 
resources for this research project because both are important when discussing the 
issue of intellectual property rights and the amateurism clause. Bloom v. NCAA is a 
case that involves a University of Colorado football player who also skied. To 
support his skiing career, Jeremy Bloom received endorsements, modeled, and 
participated in social activities that brought in money. Ed O’Bannon sued the NCAA 
for using his name and likeness in a video game. He argued that upon graduation the 
NCAA should be compensating athletes for using their image and image “likeness” 
for commercial use. While this research project will discuss a small piece of the 
intellectual property puzzle, it will provide insight into the amateurism clause and 
attempt to answer to whether athletes should be paid for their intellectual property 
and image likeness.  
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Introduction 
  
The NCAA, or National Collegiate Athletic Association, is the governing body of 
college athletics in the United States. This governing body regulates a total of more than 
1,200 Division I, II, and III member institutions and approximately 450,000 athletes 
across the nation. Its main purpose is to regulate college athletics and foster competition. 
The NCAA is a non-profit organization, but when the governing body of college athletics 
receives almost one billion dollars in revenue, fans of college athletics are skeptical of the 
“non-profit” classification. The NCAA’s status as a non-profit, although important to the 
understanding of the overall issue covered, is not the purpose of this paper. 
The focus of this paper is the amateurism clause, which generally states that no 
student-athlete shall receive improper benefits because it would jeopardize their amateur 
status. The NCAA views student-athletes as amateurs, not professionals, denying them 
any compensation outside of that which is handed to them via athletic or academic 
scholarships. 
         Jeremy Bloom and Ed O’Bannon brought different but legally significant cases 
against the NCAA to challenge the amateurism clause. Bloom, a University of Colorado 
football player, was receiving compensation from modeling agencies and advertisement 
deals due to his popularity in professional skiing. Ed O’Bannon, a former member of the 
UCLA basketball team, argued that images of himself used in NCAA advertisements 
violated his intellectual property rights via image likeness. From both cases, it can be 
determined that amateurism is a troublesome regulation that, if not fixed now, will 
continue to be a problem for the NCAA in the future.  
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         This paper documents the history of the NCAA, what has already been brought to 
court in terms of litigation surrounding the amateurism clause, and how it affects the 
intellectual property rights of student-athletes. While this paper will provide descriptive 
explanations of legal theories that stem from the Bloom and O’Bannon cases, it will also 
include insight into what the NCAA could do to avoid future litigation.    
  
The NCAA 
         The formation of the NCAA is crucial in understanding why the issue of 
amateurism is important today. In the mid-1800’s, college athletics began with 
competitions between intra-collegiate clubs. The popularity of these competitions grew. 
The first inter-collegiate competition occurred between Yale and Harvard in 1852, and it 
a student-organized rowing competition (ASHE, 2015). Events such as these continued to 
grow in frequency and President Roosevelt became involved due to several deaths and 
excessive brutality in college football games (ASHE, 2015). 
         President Theodore Roosevelt was instrumental in asking Harvard, Yale, and 
Princeton to meet with him at the White House to develop a plan to reform college 
football (ASHE, 2015). President Roosevelt had no enforcement powers over colleges, 
but it was evident from this meeting and subsequent meetings, that player safety and a 
recognizable chain of order needed to be an integral part of intercollegiate athletics 
(ASHE, 2015). These meetings resulted initially in the creation of the IAAUS, or the 
Intercollegiate Athletic Association of the United States in March of 1906. The 
organization would later be renamed the National Collegiate Athletic Association in 1910 
(ASHE, 2015). 
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The NCAA’s first constitution included player safety and administrative 
language, as well as the amateur clause. The amateur clause states that “‘an amateur 
sportsman is one who engages in sports for the physical, mental, or social benefits he 
derives therefrom, and to whom the sport is an avocation. Any college athlete who takes 
pay for participation in athletics does not meet this definition of amateurism’” (ASHE, 
2015). This was the first codified definition of the word amateurism by the NCAA. 
As soon as the NCAA had a constitution, a well-defined definition of amateurism, 
and an organized team of administrative personnel, the “notions of amateurism and grant-
in-aid created a powerful philosophical divide between the northern and southern regions 
of the United States” (ASHE, 2015). The split became more prominent when World War 
II veterans came back from the war and wanted to participate in college athletics. The 
soldiers were more experienced athletes because of the athletic teams they formed in the 
armed services (ASHE, 2015). This became an unfair advantage for schools that could 
recruit these soldiers from across the country (ASHE, 2015). 
As a result of these advantages, the NCAA created the Sanity Code in 1948. This 
litigation gave NCAA members rules on the “allowable amount of financial aid that 
could be given to intercollegiate athletes” (ASHE, 2015). There was a major dispute over 
this code though because southern universities were not as established as ones in the 
north at the time of the code’s creation. The Big Ten and the Ivy League had the financial 
resources to recruit players because they were more established. For example, this enticed 
many student-athletes from the south to move north in order to participate in 
intercollegiate athletics (ASHE, 2015). Since these recruits were not allowed to be paid, 
they became students on campus, and the term “student-athlete” was born. 
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Walter Byers, the first executive director of the NCAA in 1951, created the term 
student-athlete in response to the “fallout [from] the Sanity Code and the popularity of 
the grant-in-aid [idea]” (ASHE, 2015). Byers wanted to ensure student-athletes were not 
considered employees of a school. Because Byers saw the potential for college athletics 
to become more commercialized, he “knew that classifying college athletes as employees 
could crumble the financial structure of the NCAA itself” (ASHE, 2015). If student-
athletes were considered employees, the NCAA member schools would expose 
themselves to increased expenditures for athlete salaries and be subject to federal labor 
law. 
  
Amateurism and the Student-Athlete 
Because of Byers’ prescient decision not to classify student-athletes as employees 
of the university, several new regulations were created to assure the NCAA could enforce 
the amateurism clause. In the mid 1950’s, the NCAA created regulations and changed 
bylaws to give schools the opportunity to award athletic scholarships to their student-
athletes (Sheetz, 2016). Enticing college athletes with scholarship dollars not based on 
academic merit or need-based criteria became rampant after this, and the NCAA added 
more regulations to try and control the rapid growth of these financial packages. 
Commercialization and amateurism competed against financial aid, and to gain 
better control of  the distinction between them, the NCAA strengthened the amateurism 
clause. The NCAA “gained better control over its member institutions by establishing 
enforcement authority over the amateurism provisions” (Sheetz, 2016). Provisions 
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included student-athlete eligibility, financial inducement cutbacks, improper payments, 
and the NCAA abolished all pay-for-play models (Sheetz, 2016). 
In 1948, the NCAA permitted student-athletes to receive any type of scholarship, 
such as merit or need-based, but there were still instances of cheating and unethical 
behavior when boosters and alumni began making illegal payments to student-athletes 
(Afshar, 2014). To make it more difficult to receive these illegal payments, the NCAA 
established full grant-in-aid scholarships. These grant-in-aid scholarships were intended 
to pay for “tuition, fees, room and board, books and monthly laundry money stipend” 
(Afshar, 2014). In 2011, Mark Emmert, the current president of the NCAA created a new 
rule that gave Division I-A and I-AA schools the ability to pay student-athletes a $2,000 
stipend (Afshar, 2014). This, in addition to the previous regulations, further blurred the 
definition of amateurism. 
         The amateurism clause allowed the NCAA to draw a distinction between 
collegiate and professional athletes (Sheetz, 2016). Today the NCAA bylaws clearly state 
that college athletics “‘are designed to be an integral part of the educational program, and 
therefore it is necessary to ‘maintain a clear line of demarcation between college athletics 
and professional sports’” (Sheetz, 2016). In Section 12.1.2 of the NCAA bylaws, an 
athlete can lose his or her amateur status by, 
  
“(a) Using his or her athletics skill (directly or indirectly) for pay in any form in 
that sport; (b) accepts a promise of pay even if such pay is to be received 
following completion of intercollegiate athletics participation; (c) signs a 
contract or commitment of any kind to play professional athletics, regardless of 
its legal enforceability or any consideration received…; (d) receives directly or 
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indirectly, a salary, reimbursement or expenses or any other form of financial 
assistance from a professional organization based on athletics skills or 
participation, except as permitted by NCAA rules and regulations; (e) competes 
on any professional athletics team…even if no pay or remuneration for expenses 
was received…; (f) after initial full-time collegiate enrollment, enters into 
professional draft…[;or] (g) enters into an agreement with and agent”(Sheetz, 
2016). 
These regulations are intended to prevent student-athletes from receiving compensation 
for their athletic talent.   
Despite this NCAA definition, student-athletes often “view themselves first as an 
athlete for their respective sports, and second as a student of the university” (Afshar, 
2014). Yet, since the student-athletes are not defined as employees of their respective 
universities, they do not have the same rights under labor law as professional athletes. 
Professional athletes have the right to organize as a union and collectively bargain for 
issues such as player salaries, free agency, and disciplinary rules. NCAA student-athletes 
do not have the right to organize a union and no voice in NCAA regulations that govern 
their eligibility, transfer rights, and how many hours they can spend in practice per week.  
This paper will focus on two significant court cases that challenged the 
amateurism clause and what impact these court cases have had on NCAA amateur 
regulations. Jeremy Bloom was a professional skier who received endorsement money, 
but had his compensation rights revoked when he enrolled at the University of Colorado 
to play football. Ed O’Bannon was a UCLA basketball player who filed an antitrust 
lawsuit claiming that the NCAA was violating his intellectual property rights. Following 
is an analysis of these cases.   
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Bloom v. NCAA (2004) 
 
Facts of the Case 
Jeremy Bloom was a football player at the University of Colorado. He was also an 
Olympic and World Cup skier. He appeared in television advertisements and received 
endorsement deals for his skiing success. In a case decided on appeal in 2004, Bloom 
fought for his right to earn endorsement money from a commercially directed ski 
equipment company and modeling compensation for Tommy Hilfiger, Oakley, Dynastar, 
and Under Armour in order to support his aspirations to compete in the 2000 Winter 
Olympics (Bloom v. NCAA, 2004) Bloom played football for two years on the 
University of Colorado football team. After losing his legal battle against the NCAA, he 
was ruled ineligible to compete in NCAA football and resumed his skiing career. 
 
Bloom’s Argument 
         On behalf of Jeremy Bloom, the University of Colorado “requested waivers of 
NCAA rules restricting student-athlete endorsement and media activities, and then, a 
favorable interpretation of the NCAA rule restricting media activities” (Bloom v. NCAA, 
2004). The NCAA denied the University of Colorado’s waiver because of bylaws 12.4.1, 
12.5.1.3, and 12.5.2.1 (NCAA Division I Manual, 2015). Bylaw 12.4.1 states 
“compensation paid to student-athletes ‘must be consistent with the limitations on 
financial aid set forth in Bylaw 15. Compensation may be paid to a student-athlete: (a) 
Only for work actually performed; and (b) At a rate commensurate with the going rate in 
the locality for similar services’” (NCAA Division I Manual, 2015). In other words, 
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money given to a student-athlete for actual work performed should be at a rate that is 
equal to similar services provided by others. Bloom argued that this Bylaw did not apply 
to him because football was not a similar service to skiing. He argued that he should be 
able to keep receiving endorsement money through his professional skiing career. 
         Additionally, Bloom argued that he owned his own intellectual creations, such as 
advertisements and other sponsored media. The NCAA disagreed and stated that his 
creations were not his because of his enrollment at an NCAA governed school. 
According to bylaw 12.5.1.3 at the time of this case, if a student-athlete recommissions 
the use of his likeness in images that promote a commercial product prior to his or her 
enrollment in a NCAA-governed institution, they cannot be in jeopardy of losing 
eligibility if:  
  
“the individual's involvement in this type of activity was initiated prior to his or 
her enrollment in a member institution; the individual became involved in such 
activities for reason independent of athletics ability; no reference is made in 
these activities to the individual’s name or involvement in intercollegiate 
athletics; the individual does not endorse the commercial product; any 
compensation received by the individual is consistent with applicable limitations 
on a student-athlete’s maximum amount of financial aid; and the individual’s 
remuneration under such circumstances is at a rate commensurate with the 
individual’s skills and experience as a model or performer and is not based in 
any way upon the individual’s athletics ability or reputation” (NCAA Division I 
Manual, 2015)  
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 In addition, NCAA bylaw 12.5.2.1 states that “subsequent to becoming a student-
athlete, an individual [will be ineligible] for participation in intercollegiate athletics if the 
individual: accepts any remuneration for or permits the use of his or her name or picture 
to advertise, recommend or promote directly the sale or use of a commercial product or 
service of any kind, or receives remuneration for endorsing a commercial product or 
service through the individual’s use of such product or service” (NCAA Division I 
Manual, 2015). These bylaws bar a student-athlete from accepting any compensation for 
their own intellectual creations, which typically come in the form of endorsements. For 
example, the part “if the remuneration for or permits the use of his or her name or picture 
to advertise” explicitly states that a student-athlete cannot permit the use of their own 
name or images in a commercially labeled product for which they receive compensation.  
          
NCAA’s Argument 
         During the trial, the NCAA argued five factors: legally gathering all of the 
information given to them by Bloom, protecting student-athletes from exploitation, the 
possibility of competitive or recruiting advantages, the intent of the applicable bylaw, and 
case precedent arising in similar situations (Bloom v. NCAA, 2004). 
         Information provided by Bloom, his agent, and attorney portrayed him as a multi-
sport athlete. The NCAA argued that this notion alone created confusion. The NCAA 
does not allow athletes to create commercial products for compensation related to their 
athletic ability.  The NCAA argued that it would be highly unlikely they could determine 
which commercial products were a result of Bloom’s football ability or his skiing ability 
(Bloom v. NCAA, 2004). During the trial, the NCAA was asked to resolve the confusion 
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with an explanation of rules regarding media-related activities, and how it affected 
Bloom’s eligibility. The confusion created by Bloom’s legal team did not allow the 
NCAA to effectively decipher which media produced by Bloom was because of his 
athletic ability or from his physique.  Because of this confusion, the NCAA successfully 
created doubt regarding this issue. In addition, it is quite ironic for the NCAA to care 
about Bloom enough to protect him from commercial exploitation.  The NCAA voiced 
“‘its concern that its duty to protect student-athletes from exploitation calls it to prohibit 
such activities’” (Bloom v NCAA, 2004).  
          The NCAA also tried to use an association tactic to describe the possible 
competitive and recruiting advantages that would occur if they were to allow Bloom to 
receive compensation from commercial products. If Bloom was permitted to engage in 
these media related activities then the NCAA would have to permit every athlete in the 
same or similar situation to do likewise. The argument of competitive and recruiting 
advantages was puzzling because Bloom has nothing to gain from earning a small 
amount of money from his skiing career to help pay for his education. Nonetheless, the 
NCAA made the point that being paid revokes a student athlete’s eligibility. 
         The NCAA because of the amateurism bylaws also denied Bloom’s waiver. As 
previously stated, the NCAA maintains “‘a clear line of demarcation between college 
athletics and professional sports’” (Tulsa Law Review, 2003). The NCAA is focused on 
student-athletes growing as human beings emotionally, intellectually, socially, and 
athletically. Their mission is to provide a quality education to all student athletes. Thus, 
the NCAA used several cases such as Cole v. NCAA (2000) and NCAA v. Lasege (2001) 
to support other aspects of their argument in this case.  In Cole v. NCAA (2000), Cole 
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was a partial qualifier, and was ineligible because of his academic standing in high 
school. The NCAA denied Bloom’s request to be eligible because they simply did not 
have enough information to declare whether the compensation that he was receiving was 
not because of his athletic ability.  
In NCAA v. Lasege (2001), Lasege attempted to compete in NCAA basketball 
after he signed a contract overseas to play professionally, jeopardizing his amateur status 
in basketball. Critics of this case and the NCAA argued that Lasege (2001) had nothing to 
do with Bloom because Bloom was “not seeking to compete on the ski team at CU, nor 
did he sign a professional contract to play football (Tulsa Law Review, 2003). However, 
the NCAA was able to use these cases to demonstrate that they did not arbitrarily or 
capriciously apply the amateurism bylaws. The NCAA was successful in demonstrating 
to the court that they had not capriciously denied his request for a waiver. 
 
The Court’s Decision and Rationale 
Because Bloom was unable to successfully argue that the NCAA’s enforcement 
of its amateurism policy was “arbitrary or capricious”, the court ruled in the NCAA’s 
favor. Bloom argued that “the NCAA is arbitrary in the way it applied its bylaws among 
individual students”, but the court ruled that procedural due process given to student 
athletes under the governance of the NCAA was followed. (Bloom v. NCAA, 2004).  
Bloom was “correct that he was not permitted to personally petition the NCAA, so he 
effectively submitted three petitions to the NCAA with the full assistance and support of 
the University of Colorado” (Bloom v. NCAA, 2004). The NCAA requested more 
information stemming from these petitions, and the Court found that this was not a 
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malicious act against Bloom, rather it was a reaction to a myriad of waivers that were 
already coming in by Bloom. The administrative review process of the NCAA did not 
give Bloom’s waiver “any less consideration” and according to the court, it was 
“reasonable in general and that it was reasonably applied in this case” (Bloom v. NCAA, 
2004).  
 
O’Bannon v. NCAA (2014) 
 
Facts of the Case 
         The plaintiffs in this case included twenty student-athletes who played for 
Division I men’s basketball teams or in the FBS football division. These athletes played 
from 1956 to 2009, and some went on to play professionally after college (O’Bannon v. 
NCAA, 2014). Ed O’Bannon, the lead plaintiff, played college basketball at UCLA from 
1991-1995. He was concerned with the NCAA’s use of footage of him in television 
advertisements. O’Bannon brought this case to the court to argue that the NCAA was 
restricting trade by preventing student-athletes from being compensated for the use of 
their images and likenesses on licensed products. Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act 
“makes it illegal to form any contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or 
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce […]. To prevail on a claim under this 
section, a plaintiff must show that ‘there was a contract, combination, or conspiracy; that 
the agreement unreasonably restrained trade under either a per se rule of illegality or a 
rule of reason analysis; and that the restraint affected interstate commerce’” (O’Bannon 
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v. NCAA, 2014). The District Court ruled in favor of the plaintiff. It was appealed by the 
NCAA and partly affirmed by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. 
  
Ed O’Bannon’s Argument 
         The athletes, led by O’Bannon, filed suit against the NCAA for restriction of trade 
and stated that the NCAA’s rules on athletic compensation “violate(d) the Sherman 
Antitrust Act” in two national markets: college education and group licensing (O’Bannon 
v. NCAA, 2014). 
The college education market for NCAA Football Bowl Subdivision [FBS] and 
Division I basketball created unfair recruiting advantages for these schools and athletic 
departments. The facilities offered by top-tier schools in college athletics were used to 
entice high school athletes to choose those schools instead of the Football Championships 
Series [FCS], Divisions II and III schools. The plaintiffs argued that the total “bundle of 
goods” was larger in the FBS and Division I basketball schools because they could 
provide unique “access to high-quality coaching, medical treatment, state-of-the-art 
athletic facilities, and opportunities to compete at the highest level of college sports 
(O’Bannon v. NCAA, 2014). These schools had a greater allocation of resources giving 
them the ability to provide these opportunities. Governing associations such as the 
National Intercollegiate Athletic Association, National Junior College Athletic 
Association, National Christian College Athletic Association, and the United States 
Collegiate Athletic Association were unable to compete with the NCAA because they 
provided less scholarship dollars (O’Bannon v. NCAA, 2014). O’Bannon argued that the 
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NCAA created a “one-track” system for high school athletes to play professionally after 
college, thus restricting trade. 
In addition to college education, O’Bannon’s second claim was that there was a 
group licensing market. The group licensing market brought the amateurism clause into 
conflict with intellectual property rights. O’Bannon claimed that “‘in the absence of the 
NCAA’s [compensation rules], FBS football and Division I basketball players would also 
be able to sell group licenses for the use of their names, images, and likenesses’” 
(O’Bannon v. NCAA, 2014). O’Bannon requested that, on behalf of student-athletes, 
licenses could be sold to companies that create media content for NCAA member 
institutions. This was O’Bannon’s attempt to stop the ongoing infringement of the 
student-athletes’ intellectual property rights by the NCAA. Intellectual property rights 
reside only where markets are found. O’Bannon had to establish a market for live game 
telecast production, video game production, and re-broadcasts, advertisements, and other 
archival footage (O’Bannon v. NCAA, 2014). 
         Television networks regularly sign licensing agreements to use the “intellectual 
property of schools, conferences, and event organizers (O’Bannon v. NCAA, 2014). 
Networks do this to obtain the rights to display institutional intellectual property [logos, 
players, etc.] on television screens. When signing these contracts, consent is given by the 
NCAA. This was proven through broadcast expert Edwin Desser, an expert witness for 
the plaintiff. Desser made it clear that provisions for licensing names, images, and 
likenesses are common, and they have some monetary value for television networks 
(O’Bannon v. NCAA, 2014). He also stated, “‘If you’re running a business like a 
television network, a broadcast station, you would prefer to have consent, and you would 
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like to have somebody stand behind these consents so that you don’t have to worry about 
somebody coming after you later with a claim’” (O’Bannon v. NCAA, 2014). The NCAA 
did not ask its student-athletes for consent because the student-athletes could not receive 
any of the benefits from the licensing agreement.   
         The idea of group licensing agreements caught the attention of video game 
developers. EA [Electronic Arts] created collegiate sport games using each Division I-A 
school in the NCAA, the games were meant to be authentic representation of NCAA 
sports (O’Bannon v. NCAA 2014). In addition, Electronic Arts worked out licensing 
deals and formed agreements with “professional sports leagues and teams to use their 
trademarks, logos, and other intellectual property in videogames” (O’Bannon v. NCAA, 
2014). They also negotiated deals to use the names, images, and likenesses of individual 
professional athletes (O’Bannon v. NCAA, 2014). The cycle of yearly production and 
consumer purchase of the EA video games was grounds for a group licensing market 
being established outside of collegiate sports. 
 O’Bannon showed that there was a market for this type of product through 
playable avatars that were replications of student-athletes, and the constant renewal of the 
licensing agreement showed that revenue was the motive. If a company, such as the 
NCAA, renews a product license, it is reasonable to infer that you enjoy this product. 
Ironically, the NCAA did not renew its license with Electronic Arts because it’s “worried 
about how much it is racking up in legal fees dealing with [O’Bannon v. NCAA]” (Legal 
Monitor, 2013). It can be said that this is an excuse to cover up the fact that exploitation 
of a niche market might have occurred.  
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 In addition to game broadcast agreements with television networks and video 
game licensing agreements with EA, the NCAA also had agreements with the television 
networks that allowed the networks to use archival footage of NCAA games and 
tournaments. These licensing agreements concerning re-broadcasts, advertisements, and 
other archival footage were completed when the plaintiffs were still in school (O’Bannon 
v. NCAA, 2014). The NCAA licensed this intellectual property to a third-party company 
named T3Media (O’Bannon v. NCAA, 2014). T3Media was not allowed to license 
footage of student-athletes while they were in school. The agreement between the NCAA 
and T3Media showed a market demand among “television networks, third party licensing 
companies, and advertisers for group licenses to use student-athletes in game re-
broadcasts, advertisements, and other archival footage” (O’Bannon v. NCAA, 2014). 
Thus, O’Bannon argued that there is a market for licensed college products, even after the 
student-athlete has graduated. 
 
The NCAA’s Argument 
         The NCAA’s argument was focused on amateurism, competition among FBS 
football and Division I basketball teams, and maintaining a combination of academics 
and athletics for student-athletes while increasing the total output, or opportunities to 
participate in Division I athletics of its product (O’Bannon v. NCAA, 2014). 
         Amateurism preserves the NCAA’s principle of first and foremost providing a 
college education to its student-athletes. During testimony, Dr. Emmert stated that “‘the 
rules over the hundred-year history of the NCAA around amateurism have focused on 
[…], making sure that any resources that are provided to a student-athlete are only those 
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that are focused on his or her [education]’” (O’Bannon v. NCAA, 2014). The emphasis 
on amateurism was important to the NCAA and the NCAA argued that education was not 
just important to them but to student-athletes as well. 
During trial proceedings, Dr. J. Michael Dennis, who had conducted a survey of 
almost 2,500 respondents for the NCAA, concluded that a majority of [the respondents] 
did not approve of the idea that student-athletes should be paid (O’Bannon v. NCAA, 
2014). However, the court did not find this survey provided an accurate public perception 
on the matter. The questions prompted certain responses such as an open-ended question 
at the beginning of the survey asking, “‘What [respondents] had heard about student 
athletes being paid?’” (O’Bannon v. NCAA, 2014). Manipulative questions gave faulty 
information on consumer demand of college athletics, and Walter Byers states that 
consumer demand was not factored into defending amateurism.  
In a deposition given by Walter Byers, this claim was contradicted. Byers said 
that the NCAA’s decision in 1975 to remove incidental expenses from grant-in-aid was 
not motivated by consumer demand (O’Bannon v. NCAA, 2014). Byers specifically 
noted that during the years of 1956 and 1975, the NCAA grew in popularity (O’Bannon 
v. NCAA, 2014). Stating that the NCAA experienced growth during the years before the 
change in 1975 provided evidence against that claim. Consumer demand was on the rise, 
and consumer interests did not influence their final decision to remove incidental 
expenses from grant-in-aid.  
         From this, the Court “found that the NCAA’s restrictions on student-athlete 
compensation are not the driving force behind consumer demand for FBS football and 
Division I basketball-related products” (O’Bannon v. NCAA, 2014). Experiencing 
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growth and creating change that made it increasingly difficult for student-athletes to 
obtain more compensation due to the reversal of incidental expenses being discarded 
from grant-in-aid did not show that consumer demand was supporting the preservation of 
amateurism. 
 Additionally, the NCAA countered O’Bannon’s expert witness Mr. Desser with 
their own broadcasting expert Neal Pilson, who stated “‘sport broadcasters need not 
acquire the rights to use student-athletes’ names, images, and likenesses and that the 
primary reason they enter into licensing agreements with event organizers is to gain 
exclusive access to the facility where the event will occur’” (O’Bannon v. NCAA, 2014). 
The court found this testimony lacked standing because Mr. Pilson also stated that 
sometimes these agreements include the transfer of intellectual property rights. The court 
found that there is room for athletes to “create and sell group licenses for the use of their 
names, images, and likenesses in live game telecasts” (O’Bannon v. NCAA, 2014). 
 To O’Bannon’s claim that the NCAA found a group licensing market in video 
games, the NCAA argued that “such demand would not exist because it has ceased 
licensing its intellectual property for [the NCAA] in video games, making it unlikely that 
any developer would seek to develop a videogame using the names, images, and 
likenesses of student-athletes (O’Bannon v. NCAA, 2014). The Court ruled that this was 
not supported because of the NCAA’s inability to prove that they would never go back to 
conversing with Electronic Arts or any other video game developer about group licensing 
agreements. There weren’t any current bylaws at the time of this case that forbade such 
future agreements (O’Bannon v. NCAA, 2014). The NCAA also found it to be beneficial, 
and profitable, for them to enter agreements with EA, which was demonstrated during the 
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trial by the continued renewal of the agreements concerning image likenesses and 
intellectual property (O’Bannon v. NCAA, 2014).  
Other than the preservation of amateurism, the NCAA’s defense to O’Bannon 
also consisted of assertions that its restrictions on student-athletes were put in place to 
maintain the current level of competitive balance, highlight the integration of academics 
and athletics, and to increase the number of opportunities for schools to participate in 
FBS football and Division I basketball (O’Bannon v. NCAA, 2014). 
The NCAA argued that the current restrictions on student-athletes were in place to 
maintain a competitive balance between NCAA schools. The Court found this absurd 
because of the NCAA’s willingness to let schools, especially those with large amounts of 
money flowing into the athletic programs, spend enormous amounts of money on 
“coaching, recruiting, and training facilities” (O’Bannon v. NCAA, 2014). During the 
trial, Dr. Emmert revealed that it “‘is not the mission of the association to […] try and 
take away the advantages of a university that’s made significant commitment[s] to 
facilities and tradition and all of the things that go along with building a program’” 
(O’Bannon v. NCAA, 2014). If it is the job of the NCAA to focus on creating a 
competitive balance, then it is also their job to control the amount of spending that goes 
into recruiting, coaching, and training facilities. Over time, schools with larger budgets 
have been undeterred from spending large amounts of money to gain a competitive 
advantage. 
One of the core principles of the NCAA is for student athletes to earn an 
education while they play a sport. The NCAA believes that “the integration of academics 
and athletics increases the quality of the educational services its member schools provide 
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to student-athletes in the college education market […]” (O’Bannon v. NCAA, 2014). 
The benefits of being a student-athlete are increased access “to financial aid, tutoring, 
academic support, mentorship, structured schedules, and other education services […] 
(O’Bannon v. NCAA, 2014). The NCAA provided only one piece of evidence regarding 
this core principle, which were the testimonies of university administrators who “asserted 
that paying student-athletes large sums of money would potentially ‘create a wedge’ 
between student-athletes and others on campus (O’Bannon v. NCAA, 2014). O’Bannon 
claimed that he “felt ‘like an athlete masquerading as a student’ during his college years” 
(O’Bannon v. NCAA, 2014). The Court found that the link between “student” and 
“athlete” seemed to be missing or distorted. 
         The NCAA also stated that amateurism regulations are “reasonable” with regards 
to the “increase [in] the number of opportunities available to schools and student-athletes 
to participate in FBS football and Division I basketball, which ultimately increases the 
number of games that can be played” (O’Bannon v. NCAA, 2014). The NCAA claimed 
its compensation restrictions on student-athletes increased the amount of schools 
participating in FBS football and Division I basketball. The number of schools 
“participating in FBS football and Division I basketball has increased steadily over time 
and continues to increase today” (O’Bannon v. NCAA, 2014). Dr. Emmert stated that this 
increase was due to the philosophical commitment to amateurism, rather than increased 
revenues (O’Bannon v. NCAA, 2014). The Court found this argument unconvincing, and 
presented evidence on why increased output was not the result of the NCAA’s 
philosophical defense of preserving amateurism.  
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The Court stated the increase in schools participating in Division I athletics was 
not because of the NCAA’s philosophical commitment to amateurism, but rather due to 
the enticing opportunities presented in the form of increased “school profile and 
increased athletics-based revenue” (O’Bannon v. NCAA, 2014). This is evident in the 
fact that most schools would rather be in NCAA’s Division I and not Division II or III.  If 
the compensation restraints were lifted, it would not be plausible to think that schools 
would leave because of financial reasons; Division I schools provide overwhelmingly 
more opportunities for revenue related events compared to schools in the two lower 
divisions.   
 
Court’s Decision, Rationale, and Solution Analysis 
         The Court ruled in favor of the plaintiff, Ed O’Bannon because he proved that 
markets existed in college education and group licensing. The NCAA did not prove to the 
Court that the preservation of amateurism was a viable regulation to protect student-
athletes from exploitation. The provision of a college education should be the primary 
objective of the NCAA, but because of its lucrative business dealings with licensing 
companies, the NCAA and its member schools sometimes fail to provide the standard of 
extraordinary education it tries to achieve. This case was eventually appealed by the 
NCAA and upheld in part by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.  
 During the trial, O’Bannon presented three alternatives to the NCAA restrictions 
concerning student-athletes’ amateur status. These alternatives included: 1) raising the 
NCAA grant-in-aid limit to allow schools to award stipends derived from specified 
sources of licensing revenue; 2) to allow schools to deposit a share of licensing revenue 
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into a trust fund for student athletes which could be paid after the student athletes 
graduated or left school for other reasons; or, 3) permit student athletes to receive limited 
compensation for third-party endorsements approved by their schools (O’Bannon v. 
NCAA, 2014). 
         The first proposal, the Court found, was a way to increase grant-in-aid and 
provide stipends to student-athletes. This stipulation would not break any NCAA bylaws 
if the grant-in-aid did not go above the cost of attendance (O’Bannon v. NCAA, 2014). 
This solution seemed plausible because it eliminated the discrepancy between the cost of 
attendance and grant-in-aid amount provided to student athletes. However, student-
athletes would only be able to use the increased grant-in-aid stipend towards the 
completion of their education. 
         The second proposal was to allow universities to create trusts for student-athletes. 
The money deposited into the trust for a student-athlete would be held until graduation or 
they left the university for other reasons. This would not violate NCAA bylaws given that 
the money was equally spread out between individuals and limited (O’Bannon v. NCAA, 
2014). The NCAA was worried about consumer demand concerning this provision, but 
the Court found that providing trusts for student-athletes would further “minimize any 
potential impact on consumer demand” (O’Bannon v. NCAA, 2014).  
The question stemming from this proposal was how much money should each 
student-athlete receive as part of their trust fund.  The NCAA argued that this 
compensation must be based on licensing and intellectual property rights only and not on 
the athletic abilities of an individual athlete (O’Bannon v. NCAA, 2014). Further 
considerations regarding the reasons a student-athlete might leave the university before 
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graduating (i.e. suspension, dismissal, or transfer), and whether they would still be 
entitled to a trust was a complex matter the court felt should be determined by the NCAA 
or its member institutions. 
          The third proposal allowing student athletes to receive money for endorsements, 
“doesn’t offer a less restrictive way for the NCAA to achieve its purposes” (O’Bannon v. 
NCAA, 2014).  Allowing students-athletes to receive money for endorsements, would 
completely undermine the NCAA’s principle of amateurism.  Although Dr. Emmert 
conceded that “commercial exploitation” had slipped through the cracks periodically, he 
could not come to terms with this proposal because it would destroy amateurism. 
(O’Bannon v. NCAA, 2014). The Court found that this provision provided by the 
plaintiff was not a “viable” solution to the problem (O’Bannon v. NCAA, 2014). 
 
What Did These Historic Cases Prove? 
Jeremy Bloom’s case against the NCAA was crucial in understanding the 
amateurism clause and its application to student-athletes who are professional athletes 
prior to enrolling at a NCAA member institution. Bloom’s case also provided insight into 
the lengths the NCAA will go to protect the amateurism clause. For example, it is 
permissible for student-athletes to be a professional athlete in one sport but participate in 
a different sport as an NCAA student-athlete. Bloom was a world-class Olympic and 
professional skier as well as an NCAA collegiate football player. The NCAA was 
unwilling to grant Bloom a waiver because they do not permit student-athletes to 
capitalize on their athletic skills for compensation in any form.     
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O’Bannon’s case against the NCAA highlighted the markets present in college 
athletics (Steele, 2015). The landscape of college athletics is rapidly changing, and the 
amateurism clause has not kept pace with these changes.  Commercially speaking, the 
value of college athletics has grown exponentially with technology developments making 
collegiate athletic contests and tournaments more accessible to the average fan. The 
O’Bannon case demonstrated that there is a market for NCAA collegiate athletics and 
athlete compensation. e “The purposes the NCAA purports for its amateurism rules are 
no longer a part of today’s big-time college athletics marketplace, and there is not 
procompetitive economic evidence for restricting this market” (Steele, 2015).  
These two different but in some ways similar court cases illuminate a myriad of 
issues with the NCAA’s amateurism clause. These issues are not going to disappear and 
will continue to challenge the NCAA to re-define its amateurism clause. As collegiate 
athletics become a more lucrative business the line between professionalism and 
amateurism will continue to be blurred.   
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